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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Penrose Larsen Land, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Dennis Land, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 16238 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action based upon an Order modifying a 
Decree of Divorce previously entered between plaintiff and 
defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court. From an order in 
favor of plaintiff modifying the Decree of Divorce, the 
defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks reversal of the order of modification 
in favor of the plaintiff and the entry of an order in his 
favor as a matter of equity, or that failing, a new hearing. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was granted a Decree of Divorce from the de-
fendant on November 29, 1974, wherein it was provided, among 
other things: 
"8. Plaintiff is awarded the home and real property 
of the parties located at 5171 South 2870 East, Salt 
Lake City, Utah subject to an interest of Defendant 
who is awarded a 50 percent interest in the present 
equity in the home which value shall be determined by 
independent appraisers selected by the parties and 
shall be fixed not later than January 1, 1975 ... " 
"9. The plaintiff shall assume as her sole obliga-
tion the first mortgage on the home and shall make the 
required payments on that mortgage. The defendant 
shall assume as his sole obligation the second mort-
gage on the home and shall make the required payments 
on this mortgage until paid in full." (R-24) 
The defendant was further ordered to assume and pay all 
of the debts and obligations incurred by the parties up to 
the time that the divorce action was filed, except for the 
mortgage that the plaintiff was ordered to assume and pay. 
(R-24) 
The Decree also fixed the amount of child support which 
the defendant was ordered to pay which was to increase in 
amount to $133.33 per month for each of the three minor child-
ren when the second mortgage that the defendant was ordered 
to pay was paid in full. (R-23) 
This Decree was based upon a property stipulation that 
the parties had executed. (R-16 to 18) 
At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce the 
defendant had numerous tax liens and judgments against him 
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arising out of a business that he was awarded under the 
Decree, the business being known as the "Eat'n House". 
These liens and judgments by operation of law became liens 
on the real property which had been awarded to the plaintiff, 
but subject to the 50% interest of the defendant. The 
amount of these encumbrances being in the approximate sum 
of $27,000.00. (R-77) 
Following the entry of the Decree neither party did 
anything to have the house and property appraised as dic-
tated by the Decree. 
The defendant set about the task of paying off the 
tax liens and judgments against him -- something that he is 
still working on, having paid some $9,000.00. (R-82) De-
fendant also paid in full the second mortgage on the real 
property which he had been order~d to pay. 
In August, 1978, the defendant filed a motion with 
the Court for the modification of the Decree to reduce child 
support payments from $133.00 per month to $100.00 per month, 
based upon a change of circumstances in his business which 
reduced his monthly income therefrom. (R-29, 30) The child 
support had been automatically raised with the payment in 
full of the second mortgage. 
Plaintiff countered and demanded an increase in child 
support and asserted that the defendant should quit-claim 
the real property to plaintiff as the defendant had no int-
erest in the property by reason of the tax liens and judgments 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which had been liens against the property at the time of the 
entry of the Decree had exceeded the value of his 50% inter-
est. (R-34) 
The matter was heard by the Court on the 16th of Novem-
ber, 1978, before the Honorable Christine M. Durham; and at 
the conclusion of the hearing the Court entered its Minute 
Entry wherein it ruled that the liens and judgment liens 
against the home at the time of the Decree of Divorce were 
to be taken into account in determining the equity, if any, 
of the defendant. 
The Court further found that there was not a sufficient 
change of circumstances as to merit a reduction in the child 
support and further ordered the defendant to pay 50% of the 
costs of a medical and dental insurance policy. (R-41, 42) 
An Order was entered upon prepared Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and from that Order the defendant filed 
his Notice of Appeal. (R-51) 
No transcript of the original divorce proceedings was 
available as a court reporter was not present when the div-
orce was granted. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE EQUITY OF THE 
DEFENDANT IN THE REAL PROPERTY WOULD BE REDUCED 
BY ALL LIENS, JUDGMENTS AND OTHER ENCUMBRANCES AS 
OF THE DATE OF THE DECREE 
It is the contention of the defendant that as he was 
ordered to pay and discharge all of the liens, debts and 
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judgments against the parties up to the time of the filing 
of the action for divorce, as well as the second mortgage 
on the real property, the equity in the real property to 
which he was entitled, in the amount of 50%, would be the 
appraised value, less the amount of the first and second 
mortgages only. 
The Court ruled that the equity was determined by tak-
ing the appraised value of the property and subtracting not 
only the first and second mortgages, but the liens, judg-
ments and other encumbrances as well. 
The testimony of the parties was that the amount of the 
liens and judgments exceeded the sum of $27,000.00 as of the 
date of the Decree of Divorce. This was in addition to the 
amount of the first and second mortgages, which totaled the 
approximate sum of $25,000.00. 
Defendant clail!ls that he has paid off about $9,000.00 
of the liens and judgments. 
The Property Stipulation, Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and the Decree are silent as to just what was 
meant by the parties for the calculation of the equity in 
the real property. 
There being nothing upon which the Court could base a 
determination of what the measure was to be, the Court app-
lied its own standard; and that is what the defendant appeals 
from, as it is his contention that the Court did not do 
equity in this matter. 
-5-
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The law of Utah is clear that in all aspects of pro-
ceedings in divorce matters equity shall be applied. Iverson 
v. Iverson, (Utah, 1974) 526 P. 2d 1126. 
Because divorce proceedings are in equity, the Supreme 
Court can review questions of both law and fact. King v. 
King, 25 U. 2d 163, 478 P. 2d 495. 
It is true that the parties in this matter entered into 
a stipulation and would normally be bound thereby. However, 
the Court has the right to see that equity is done between 
the parties. Klein v. Klein, (Utah, 1975) 544 P. 2d 472. 
The difficulty is, that the stipulation does not fully set 
forth all of the information necessary to interpret what 
was meant by the Decree. 
As there is no stenographic record, the Court must now 
look to what is reasonable and just under the circumstances. 
Plaintiff was to be awarded the real property subject 
to an interest of 50% in the equity being awarded to the de-
fendant. As the property was heavily encumbered by liens 
and judgment liens arising out of the defendant's business, 
it would have been a meaningless gesture on the part of the 
Trial Court to award a 50% interest in the real property but 
then direct the defendant to pay and discharge all of the 
liens, judgment liens and the second mortgage covering the 
property in question, but then not allow a credit for the 
payment and discharge of those encumbrances, save and ex-
cept the second mortgage. 
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It is submitted that equity would dictate that the 
equity in the home was to be determined as the value as of 
January 1, 1975, less the amount of the first and second 
mortgages. Of that resulting equity value, the defendant 
was entitled to 50% interest, payable as set forth in the 
Decree of Divorce. 
It is submitted that the interpretation given to the 
Decree by the Trial Court was in error, as the Trial Court 
held that the equity in the real property was the value of 
the property less all liens, judgment liens, encumbrances 
of all kinds and additionally, all mortgages. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that on principles of 
justice and equity the defendant's contention on how the 
Decree should be interpreted 'is just and proper and that 
the Court should render its decision so holding and remand 
this matter for entry of a Decree in conformity therewith. 
LLY SUBMITTED, 
-?-=-~~~~~------------------
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